Publications

2003
Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2003. “Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC’03), Pp. 238–239.
2002
Julian A. Padget, David C. Parkes, Norman M. Sadeh, Onn Shehory, and William E. Walsh. 2002. Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2002 Workshop. Edited by Julian A. Padget, David C. Parkes, Norman M. Sadeh, Onn Shehory, and William E. Walsh. Springer-Verlag.
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. “An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction.” In Proc. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop on The Economics of the Internet. Stanford, CA.
David C. Parkes. 2002. “Challenge Problem: Agent-Mediated Decentralized Information Mechanisms.” In Proc. AAMAS’02 Workshop on AgentCities: Challenges in Open Agent Environments. Bologna, Italy.
David C. Parkes. 2002. “On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions”.
David C. Parkes. 2002. “Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems (LNAI 2531), edited by J. Padget, D. Parkes, N. Sadeh, O.Shehory, and W.Walsh, Pp. 103–122. Springer-Verlag.
Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2002. “Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation”.
2001
David C. Parkes, Jayant R. Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso. 2001. “Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Combinatorial Exchanges”.
David C. Parkes, Jayant R. Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso. 2001. “Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges.” In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’01), Pp. 1161–1168.
David C. Parkes and Lloyd Greenwald. 2001. “Approximate and Compensate: A method for risk-sensitive meta-deliberation and continual computation.” In Proc. AAAI Fall Symposium on Using Uncertainty within Computation, Pp. 101-108. North Falmouth, USA.
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2001. “An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train Scheduling.” In Proc. 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01), Pp. 43–50.
David C. Parkes. 2001. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency”.
David C. Parkes. 2001. “An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation.” In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, Pp. 78–87. AAAI Press.
David C. Parkes and Bernardo A Huberman. 2001. “Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection.” Games and Economic Behavior, 35, Pp. 124–165.
2000
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2000. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice.” In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’00), Pp. 74–81.
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2000. “Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment.” In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’00), Pp. 82–89.
1999
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, and Dean P. Foster. 1999. “Accounting for cognitive costs in on-line auction design.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (LNAI 1571), edited by P Noriega and C Sierra, Pp. 25–40. Springer-Verlag.
David C. Parkes. 1999. “iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction.” In Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC’99), Pp. 148–157.
David C. Parkes. 1999. “Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems.” In Proc. IJCAI-99 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Pp. 206–219. Stockholm, Sweden.
1998
David C. Parkes and Bernardo A Huberman. 1998. “Cooperative Multiagent Search for Portfolio Selection.” In Proc. AGENTS Workshop on Artificial Societies and Computational Markets.

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