David C. Parkes
David C. Parkes
John A. Paulson Dean
George F. Colony Professor of Computer Science
Research Interests
Multi-agent AI, Bounded rationality, Machine learning and decisions, Multi-agent reinforcement learning, Intelligence architectures, Fair machine learning, Game theory, Algorithmic economics, Auction design, Market design, Mechanism design, Preference elicitation.
Ph.D. Students
Recent Publications
Working Paper
L. Hammond et al.,
“Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI”. 2025.
L. Hammond et al.,
“Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI”. 2025.
E. Soumalias, Y. Jiang, K. Zhu, M. Curry, S. Seuken, and D. C. Parkes,
“LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment”, 2025, doi: CoRR abs/2502.10308.
E. Soumalias, Y. Jiang, K. Zhu, M. Curry, S. Seuken, and D. C. Parkes,
“LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment”, 2025, doi: CoRR abs/2502.10308.
B. E. Lee, D. J. Moroz, and D. C. Parkes,
B. E. Lee, D. J. Moroz, and D. C. Parkes,
D. J. Moroz, D. J. Aronoff, N. Narula, and D. C. Parkes,
“Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems”, CoRR abs/2002.10736.
D. J. Moroz, D. J. Aronoff, N. Narula, and D. C. Parkes,
“Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems”, CoRR abs/2002.10736.
2025
A. Tacchetti et al.,
“Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 122, no. 25, p. e2319949121, 2025, doi: 10.1073/pnas.2319949121.
A. Tacchetti et al.,
“Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 122, no. 25, p. e2319949121, 2025, doi: 10.1073/pnas.2319949121.
M. Curry, Z. Fan, Y. Jiang, S. S. Ravindranath, T. Wang, and D. C. Parkes,
“Automated Mechanism Design: A Survey”, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 102–120, 2025.
M. Curry, Z. Fan, Y. Jiang, S. S. Ravindranath, T. Wang, and D. C. Parkes,
“Automated Mechanism Design: A Survey”, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 102–120, 2025.
