Duetting, Paul
Bibliographic References tagged with Duetting, Paul
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P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
“Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. ”, J. ACM , vol. 71, no. (1), pp. 5:1–5:53, 2024.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
“Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. ”, J. ACM , vol. 71, no. (1), pp. 5:1–5:53, 2024.
T. Wang, P. Duetting, D. Ivanov, I. Talgam-Cohen, and D. C. Parkes,
“Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks.”, in Proceedings of the NeurIPS 2023 (Thirty-seventh Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems), 2023.
T. Wang, P. Duetting, D. Ivanov, I. Talgam-Cohen, and D. C. Parkes,
“Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks.”, in Proceedings of the NeurIPS 2023 (Thirty-seventh Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems), 2023.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification.”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 49 , no. 2, pp. 901–927, 2024.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification.”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 49 , no. 2, pp. 901–927, 2024.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
“Optimal auctions through deep learning”, Communications of the ACM, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 109–116, 2021.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
“Optimal auctions through deep learning”, Communications of the ACM, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 109–116, 2021.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimham, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
“Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning”, in Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML’19), 2019, pp. 1706–1715.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimham, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
“Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning”, in Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML’19), 2019, pp. 1706–1715.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, and D. C. Parkes,
“Optimal Economic Design through Deep Learning”, in Proc. of the NIPS Workshop on "Learning in the Presence of Strategic Behavior", Long Beach, CA, 2017.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, and D. C. Parkes,
“Optimal Economic Design through Deep Learning”, in Proc. of the NIPS Workshop on "Learning in the Presence of Strategic Behavior", Long Beach, CA, 2017.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 196–211, 2019.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 196–211, 2019.
P. Duetting, F. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions”, in Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conf. on Economics and Computation (EC16), 2016, p. 813.
P. Duetting, F. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions”, in Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conf. on Economics and Computation (EC16), 2016, p. 813.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design”, in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’11), 2011, pp. 341–350.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design”, in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’11), 2011, pp. 341–350.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions”, in Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’14), 2014, pp. 57–74.
P. Duetting, F. A. Fischer, and D. C. Parkes,
“Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions”, in Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’14), 2014, pp. 57–74.