Skip to main content

Machine Learning

Bibliographic References tagged with Machine Learning

Not finding what you're looking for? Try using Advanced Search.
Not finding what you're looking for? Try using Advanced Search.
M. Bichler and D. C. Parkes,
M. Bichler and D. C. Parkes,
S. Fish et al.,
Generative social choice”, Journal of the ACM, vol. 73 (2), no. 1-11, 2026.
S. Fish et al.,
Generative social choice”, Journal of the ACM, vol. 73 (2), no. 1-11, 2026.
G. Personnat, T. Lin, S. Hossain, and D. C. Parkes,
Learning to play multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg games”, In Proc. 14th Int Conf on Learning Representations (ICLR), vol. 105160-105189. 2026.
G. Personnat, T. Lin, S. Hossain, and D. C. Parkes,
Learning to play multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg games”, In Proc. 14th Int Conf on Learning Representations (ICLR), vol. 105160-105189. 2026.
Y. Jiang, D. C. Parkes, and T. Wang,
Duality for optimal multi-item, multi-bidder auction design: Revenue certificates through deep learning”, Proc. 27th ACM Conf on Economics and Computation (EC’26), 2026.
Y. Jiang, D. C. Parkes, and T. Wang,
Duality for optimal multi-item, multi-bidder auction design: Revenue certificates through deep learning”, Proc. 27th ACM Conf on Economics and Computation (EC’26), 2026.
M. Curry, Z. Fan, and D. C. Parkes,
Optimal automated market makers: Differentiable economics and strong duality”, Proc. 21st Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). 2025.
M. Curry, Z. Fan, and D. C. Parkes,
Optimal automated market makers: Differentiable economics and strong duality”, Proc. 21st Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). 2025.
M. Curry, Z. Fan, Y. Jiang, S. S. Ravindranath, T. Wang, and D. C. Parkes,
Automated Mechanism Design: A Survey”, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 102–120, 2025.
M. Curry, Z. Fan, Y. Jiang, S. S. Ravindranath, T. Wang, and D. C. Parkes,
Automated Mechanism Design: A Survey”, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 102–120, 2025.
A. Tacchetti et al.,
Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 122, no. 25, p. e2319949121, 2025, doi: 10.1073/pnas.2319949121.
A. Tacchetti et al.,
Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 122, no. 25, p. e2319949121, 2025, doi: 10.1073/pnas.2319949121.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. ”, J. ACM , vol. 71, no. (1), pp. 5:1–5:53, 2024.
P. Duetting, Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, D. C. Parkes, and S. S. Ravindranath,
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. ”, J. ACM , vol. 71, no. (1), pp. 5:1–5:53, 2024.
H. Sun, Z. Deng, H. Chen, and D. C. Parkes,
Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data.”, in ICAIF 2023, 2023, pp. 36–45.
H. Sun, Z. Deng, H. Chen, and D. C. Parkes,
Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data.”, in ICAIF 2023, 2023, pp. 36–45.